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CHENERY REVISITED: REFLECTIONS ON
REVERSAL AND REMAND OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
HENRY J. FRIENDLY*
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery (Chen-
ery I) the Supreme Court established the proposition that when
an agency gives the wrong reason jbr a decision ofpolicy or law,
the reviewing court will send the case back for reconsideration,
even though the court might have upheld the order if a difJerent
reason had been assigned. In this article Judge Friendly ex-
amines the scope that courts have attributed to Chenery, con-
cludes that there are in fact three separate principles of review,
and illuminates their applicability and utility as tools of judi-
cial discretion.
T HE SUBJECT for discussion stems from the well-known decision
in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chener" Corp., in
which the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concluded that an administrative order cannot be upheld "unless the
ground upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were
those upon which its action can be sustained.'
The topic has achieved unexpected timeliness from the Court's
very recent decision in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.2 Although,
when I began my labors, I had the hope of discovering a bright shaft
of light that would furnish a sure guide to decision in every case, the
grail has eluded me; indeed I have come to doubt that it exists.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Brainerd Currie Lecturer
1969.
'318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943)
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
Determination when to reverse and remand a decision that an
administrative agency had power to make, and sufficient evidence
to support, is, I fear, perhaps more an art than a science. My inter-
est in revisiting the Chenery case was sparked by having presided
for the past several years over a three-judge district court concerned
with the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads,
and such related matters as the inclusion of three smaller roads in
the Norfolk & Western System, and Penn Central's unwilling take-
over of the New Haven. It was piqued particularly by two footnotes
to the opinion affirming our refusal to disturb the orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission which authorized the merger and
set fair and reasonable terms for Norfolk & Western's payment for
the smaller lines. In the first of these, footnote ten, which appears
in that portion of the opinion dealing with the Penn Central merger,
the Court stated simply: "And appellants' attack upon the District
Court's opinion on the basis of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947), totally misconceives the limited office of that decision. See
note 14 infra."3 The second, note 14, in the part of the opinion dealing
with inclusion of the three roads in the Norfolk & Western, read in
relevant part:
We reject N & W's argument that the District Court was guilty of
a violation of the rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947). N & W attempts to extend the principle of that case far
beyond its limits. But even if we were to accept N & W's
construction of the case, N & W's conclusion would not
follow. . . . [T]he District Court appears to have agreed in
substance with all the major findings of the Commission. To the
Commission's analysis it added several points that it believed
would also support the Commission's conclusions. ..
I am not usually one to look a gift horse in the mouth,
especially when it comes from the Supreme Court. When seven of
eight Justices say that an attack on one of my opinions is "totally
misconceived" and "reject" the appellant's arguments, I like
it-especially since the Court has not invariably vouchsafed me
2 U.S., decided April 23, 1969. See note 46 infra.
Penn-Central Mergei" and N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 518-19 n.10 (1968).
389 U.S. at 526-27 n.14.
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that pleasure. But I cannot refrain from wishing that Justice
Fortas had been less cryptic. How is the office of Chenery
"limited?" Does it mean less than Mr. Justice Frankfurter said it
meant, or just less than the Norfolk & Western claimed it meant?
Was the Court simply warning against overenthusiasm about
Chenery or was it backtracking? Or, Was it perhaps saying that this
was not a true Chenery situation at all?
The Chenery case concerned the reorganization of the Federal
Water Service Corporation under sections 7 and 11 of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Some 95 percent of the
equity of the new company was to go to the preferred stockholders
of the old. During a two and a half year period in which various
plans were successively submitted to and rejected by the S EC,
persons who had controlled Federal through ownership of common
stock bought approximately eight percent of the company's
preferred on the over-the-counter market at prices substantially
lower than the book value of the new common into which the
preferred, pursuant to the plan, would be converted.6 The SEC
held that it could not approve the proposed plan if the pre-
ferred stock thus acquired was permitted t6 share on a parity
with other preferred stock. This decision was not based on fraud or
lack of required disclosure; instead, the Commission expressly
stipulated that it had found no evidence of managerial indiscretion7
Federal's managers were said to be under a "duty of fair dealing"
not to trade in the securities of the corporation while plans for its
reorganization were pending before the Commission. Consequently
the SEC ordered the plan amended to provide that the preferred
stock acquired by management was to be surrendered at cost plus
four percent interest.
Speaking for the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter read
the report as resting on a belief that the Commission was acting
"only as it assumed a court of equity would have acted in a similar
case."" However, the Court concluded that equity courts had not
gone that far, and since "[t]he grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1964).
'See 318 U.S. at 82-84.
7 Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.
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discloses that its action was based," 9 the Commission's order could
not stand. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made clear that
the Commission was not limited to the principles developed by
courts of equity and that "Congress certainly did not mean to
preclude the formulation by the Commission of standards
expressing a more sensitive regard for what is right and what is
wrong than those prevalent at the time the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 became law."' 0 Reflecting on its experience
in administering the Act, the Commission contended that a need
existed for placing sharp limits on those in control of
reorganizations and urged affirmance on that ground. While not
disputing that the Commission could lawfully utilize such
experience to come to the same conclusion it had reached on an
erroneous ground, the Court found an insuperable difficulty to
affirmance in the point "that the considerations urged here in
support of the Commission's order were not those upon which its
action was based.' ' 2 Since the Commission had professed to decide
the case according to settled judicial doctrines, it was according
to those "invoked standards" that its decision would be
judged. Consequently the case was remanded to the Commission
"for such further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as
may be appropriate."' 3
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Reed and Murphy,
dissented Wvith usual vigor. t4 Although disagreeing with the
Id. The Court added: "If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment
which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial
judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. For purposes of
affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot intrude upon the
domain which Congress had exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency." Id. at 88.
"Id. at 89.
"Id. at 90.
"Id. at 92.
I d. at 95.
"Id. A recent biography of Mr. Justice Murphy affords an interesting sidelight:
That feelings were intense behind the technical facade of the first Chenery. case
can be inferred from Frankfurter's reaction when Reed joined the minority. "Dear
Stanley," he wrote, "Were I at Cambridge I would be saddened to note that you
underwrote an opinion like Black's in the Chenery case. I don't think I should be
less saddened because J am your colleague. I hate to see you 'bogged down in the
quagmire' of Populist rhetoric unrelated to fact." Frankfurter to Reed, Jan. 29,
1943, Box 32, Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. J.
HOWARD. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY- A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 416 n. g (1968).
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majority's conclusion that decisions in equity did not support the
Commission, he further argued that he would "not suppose, as the
Court does, that the Commission's rule is not fully based on
Commission experience."' 5 Contending that the Commission
merely intended to announce for its own jurisdiction an obvious
rule of honest dealing closely related to common law standards,
Mr. Justice Black commended the Commission for "not unduly
[parading] fact data across the pages of their reports." Although
acknowledging that the Court could require the Commission to use
"'more words," the dissenters found it difficult "to imagine how
more words or different words could further illuminate [the
Commission's] purpose or its determination."' 6
The reorganization managers, on reading these opinions, must
have wondered whether the game had been worth the candle. Any
lawyer worth his salt would have placed a rather large bet that the
SEC would avail itself of the invitation the Supreme Court had
extended; and so, of courseit did. 7 The surprising elements of this
second round of litigation are first, that this action met reversal in
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals;' and, second, that
the reversal of the circuit court's decision" elicited one of the
sharpest dissents in the Supreme Court's history.20 With that
controversy, whether the Commission could proclaim its new
principle by adjudication rather than rule-making, this article is not
concerned. For purposes of this discussion the only importance of
the second Chenery decision is its reformulation of Chenery I: "We
held no more and no less than that the Commission's first order
was unsupportable for the reason supplied by that agency."',
In examining the bearing of the two footnotes in the Penn
Central opinion on the Chenery decision, this article will concentrate
on the question that led to the second footnote, since that presented
a closer problem. The issue was the price the Norfolk & Western
"Id. at 98.
"Id. at 99.
"Holding Company Act Release No. 5584 (1945).
" 154 F.2d 6 (1946).
"332 U.S. 194 (1947).
2 Id. at 209 (Jackson, J., surprisingly joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the author of
Chenery I).
2, Id. at 200. For some reason not clear to me, the Court frequently cites this passage in
Chenery II rather than Chenery I as embodying the doctrine of the latter. See. e.g., the two
footnotes, Penn-Central Merger and N &X W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 518-19 n.10,
526-27 n.14 (1968).
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should be required to pay for three roads-the Erie-Lackawanna,
the Delawvare & Hudson, and the Boston & Maine. In resolving this
problem the I.C.C. had first compared N & W's per share earnings
for the year ending June 30, 1966, adjusted upward for yet unrealized
savings from its own merger, with normalized earnings for the
smaller roads. The Commission then increased the latter figure by
the net income realizable on the business which these three roads
would gain from traffic then being handled by them or N & W on
which there would be a longer haul as a result of their being part
of the N & W's own system. This left one other variable which became
the largest single source of controversy-the adverse effect which the
Penn Central merger would have on the three roads and the degree to
which their acquisition would diminish N & W's own losses. The
Commission handled this by satisfying itself that, as our court's opin-
ion put .it, "any traffic losses the three roads would suffer to Penn
Central would be offset by other benefits to N & W not already taken
into account. '"
Although the Commission appeared properly satisfied on this
point, the court had to recognize that one calculation alternatively
relied on in determining the effect of the Penn Central merger, a
calculation the Commission had developed without benefit of
testimony or argument, made extraordinarily little sense,2 and that
another seemed decidedly liberal toward the three roads. 24 As
against this, we believed the Commission's whole approach had
been more favorable to N & W than the law required and, more
pertinently, that other elements mentioned by the Commission but
not thrown into its calculation of the effect of the Penn Central
merger compensated *for any errors in the latter.
Norfolk & Western argued that respect for the purity of the
administrative process required remand so that the I.C.C. could
revise its calculation to include those which we were ready to
approve. The court could not see why. The Commission said it
was satisfied, and figures giving ample basis for satisfaction were
there even though not every one of the Commission's computations
was solid. In strict theory, of course, there was a possibility that if
the Commission knew that the district court thought nothing of
2279 F. Supp. 3l1 , 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2 Id. at 345 n.32.
'A Id. at 344-43.
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one of its subsidiary calculations and considered another to be on
the high side, it might come out with a different ultimate result
even though the court's decision upheld its right to come out just
where it had. But no one who read the Commission's report could
fairly believe there was the slightest chance it would do anything of
the sort. Therefore, the court declind to engage in what seemed a
certain exercise in futility. It stated at one point: "[W]hat is
demanded is substantial evidence to support the agency's ultimate
findings, not logical perfection in every step.''25 Similarly, at another
point in the opinion Chenery I, so heavily relied upon by N & W,
was characterized as "[intending] only to establish the important
point that a reviewing court could not affirm an agency on a principle
the agency might not embrace-not to require the tedious process
of administrative adjudication and judicial review to be needlessly
dragged out while court and agency engage in a nigh endless game
of battledore and shuttlecock with respect to subsidiary findings." 26
Reflection has led me to wonder whether Mr. Justice Fortas
meant only that Penn Central did not present a true Chenery
problem at all. If so, I now think he would have been correct.
Chenery involved administrative reliance on a wrong reason,
whereas Penn Central raised a claim of erroneous findings made
in the course of applying a correct governing standard.27 A true
Chenery problem would have been presented if, for example,
the I.C.C. had fixed the exchange ratios for the three roads on the
basis that the effect of the Penn Central merger should be
disregarded, and the court had considered that to be wrong as a
matter of law but believed the ratios could have been justified had
the Commission given proper reasons. In that event Chenery would
have required the district court to reverse and remand, since it
could not know whether the Commission acting on a proper view
of the law might not have arrived at lower prices even though not
required to do so In contrast to Chenery, however, there was no
2 Id. at 345.
n Id. at 354-55.
27 The distinction between reasons and findings is made clear in K. DAVIS, 2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.12 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]. To the extent
here noted I confess error in a talk I prepared as a preliminary to this article, Friendly, The
"Limited Office" of the Chenery Decision, 21 -AD. L. REV. 1 (1968).
z A somewhat different, although related, problem was later presented in regard to the
inclusion of the New Haven in Penn Central. The Commission had found, 331 I.C.C. 643
(1967), that the price agreed on by Penn Central and the New Haven Trustees was equivalent
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claim in Penn Central that the I.C.C. had misapprehended the law
with respect to the issue here under discussion. Rather, the contention
was that it had not dealt properly with the facts-a problem of
erroneous findings. I do not mean to deny that the doctrines are
closely related. Indeed, it is this very similarity which has often
led courts to sweep carelessly what are in fact three separate
principles under the same Chenery tent. However, these bases of
judicial reversal of administrative decisions-that I will designate as
inadequate explanation of reasons, erroneous or insufficient findings,
and the Chenery doctrine itself-are different; and it is to an investi-
gation of their applicability and utility as tools of judicial discretion
that I now turn.
Inadequate Explanation of Reasons
The proposition that a reviewing court may reverse and remand
if an agency has not adequately explained the reasons for its
conclusions, a principle sometimes misconstrued as included within
the "Chenery doctrine," was first formulated in unmistakeable
terms, though perhaps incorrectly applied, by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 9 some two years
prior to Chenery. Dislike of this decision on its facts may lie at the
root of Professor Davis' rather unenthusiastic characterization of
Chenery as upholding "the proposition that when an agency gives
the wrong reasons for a decision of policy or law, the reviewing
court will send the case back for a new determination, even though
the court might have upheld the order if no reasons had been
assigned. "'" He further states that "[i]f the Commission had mere-
ly announced the finding and the conclusion, without writing a sup-
porting opinion, presumably the Court would have held the findings
and the reason adequate, for the FTC for several decades customarily
to the New Haven's liquidation value and that it was thus unnecessary to consider whether
the New Haven could be required to accept less. We held the figure to be considerably short
of liquidation value. 289 F. Supp. 418, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Whether or not we believed
that something less than liquidation value might suffice, we were obliged to reverse and
remand since the Commission might decide in favor of liquidation value. See Friendly, note
27 supra at 6-7. For the Commission's report on remand, see 334 I.C.C. 25 (1968). The issue
is now sub judice.
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
2 DAVIS § 16.12, at 480 (emphasis added).
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did no more and yet its orders were usually upheld."'3 The
properly professorial "might have" in the first quotation seems more
accurate than the bolder "presumably . . . would have" in the
second. If after conceding the absence of fraud or required disclosure
the SEC had simply said, "we find that the provisions for participa-
tion by the preferred stock held by *the management result in the
terms of issuance of the new securities being detrimental to the
interests of investors and the plan being unfair and inequitable," 2 it
would have exposed itself to -likely reversal and remand for inade-
quate explanation of reasons.as Once this principle of review is recog-
nized, reversal because of reliance on a legally inadmissible reason,
i.e., the Chenery doctrine, is an a fortiori case.
Professor Davis might answer that remand for inadequate
explanation of reasons is itself wrong. It is indeed difficult to
believe that a judge so sensitive to the realities of labor contro-
versies as Mr. Justice Frankfurter needed elucidation why the Labor
Board thought in Phelps 'Dodge that requiring a company to
reinstate employees unlawfully discharged for union activities would
effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act even
though the men had secured equivalent employment elsewhere.Y But
this proves only that the principle of reversal for inadequate
explanations of reasons was applied in a case not truly calling for
its use, not that the principle is wrong.u If the requirement for
reasoned decision now embodied in section 8(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act is an important tool for curbing
arbitrary action, the rule permitting reversal and remand for
inadequate explication is a sound one, though, like other sound
principles, subject to abuse.
Indeed, the rule serves an additional, and sometimes quite
useful, purpose in that it permits a court in effect to say to an
Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
" 8 S.E.C. 893, 921 (1941).
" See, e.g., Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
3 As Professor Davis points out, 2 DAvis § 16.12, at 478-79, the NLRB supplied the
altogether obvious rationale in another case decided only a few weeks later, Ford Motor Co.,
31 N.L.R.B. 994, 1099-1100 (1941).
3 Professor Davis appears to recognize this in his discussion of Secretary of Agriculture v.
United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954). 2 DAvIs § 16.12, at 479-80.
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agency, "Do you really mean it?" A recent decision from the
Second Circuit will serve to illustrate this function.36 While this
case lay in the vexed area of union attempts to force an
employer to bargain by display of authorization cards from a
majority of the employees, the district court was not concerned
with some of the larger questions on which enlightenment from the
Supreme Court is awaited? 7 Rather, the question presented was
whether the Board's rule should be applied when the union had
used methods so coercive that a rupture seemed fairly certain.
Organizers had gone to the office of a branch warehouse, accosted
the local manager, and insisted under threat of strike on almost
immediate recognition. When telephone calls to a superior did not
immediately produce the necessary authority the employees were
called out. In declining to enforce a bargaining order and
remanding, the court was saying to the NLRB in practical effect:
"We do not question your position that a union that has obtained
majority status is entitled to recognition by an emplpyer in the
absence of good faith doubt, without having to await an election.
But did you really consider whether sanctioning the conduct of a
union in forcing a split-second decision is consistent with the basic
objective of the National Labor Relations Act to secure industrial
peace?" Conceivably the Board will take the hint and re-think the
bases of its decision; if not, the court will at least have the benefit
of an explicated decision.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc.
v. United States38 admirably illustrates the virtues of this
requirement of reasoned decision. In order to effect unionization of
shortline truckers in Nebraska, the unions engaged in a secondary
boycott of trunk-line carriers on whom the shortlines depended for
connections. The shortlines organized a corporation of their own
which sought certification for operations between certain Nebraska
and Iowa points and many other states. Conceding without
1$ NLRB v. World Carpets of New York, Inc., 403 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1968).
" See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S.
997 (1968); NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 997 (1968).
- 371 U.S. 156 (1962). The Court rightly relied on its earlier decision in Jacob Siegel Co.
v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613-14 (1946). See also NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380
U.S. 438, 442-44 (1965), and Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 382 (1965Y.
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*discussion that there were other weapons for handling the situation,
the Commission granted the certificate. The Supreme Court held
that the Commission had not adequately explained its choice of
certification as against other remedies, and remanded for the
agency to "act with a discriminating awareness of the consequences
of its action." 39 To the argument of Commission counsel that other
remedies would be ineffective, the Court made a two-fold response:
The Commission had not so found, and there was no substantial
evidence to support such a finding. While the Court obviously
thought the I.C.C. had made a poor choice and several Justices were
willing to strike down the certification altogether, such a ruling
might needlessly have impaired the freedom of the Commission in
future cases. It was wiser to say, "Think it over."
Unsustainable Reasons- The Chenery Doctrine
The Chenery rule, applicable when an agency has relied on a
wrong reason, likewise serves the "think-it-over" function. As was
remarked in a perceptive contemporary comment, "judicial
compulsion on the SEC and other commissions to indicate by their
language that they are performing their proper function . . . directs
administrative commissions' attention to the nature of their
function and to the type of analysis which proper performance of
that function requires."40 Thus the Chenery Court was saying to
the SEC: "Here, instead of doing something traditional, as you
wrongly believed, you are venturing into terra incognita. Principles
of equity do not compel the ruling you made, although the statute
permits you to make it. Have you given enough thought to your
choice? Are you entirely sure the evil calls for any remedy, let alone
the drastic one you have chosen? Would compulsory disclosure of
dealings be a preferable alternative to forfeiture of profits? Have
you sufficiently considered the propriety of applying the rule to
parties who acted without knowledge that you would impose it,
as against using your rule-making authority?" These were questions
worth asking. Even if the Chenery Court had scant doubt how
they would be answered in the instant case, such a declaration
371 U.S. at 174.
40 Note, The Chenery Corporation Case: A New Landmark in the Law of Administrative
Procedure, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1002, 1005 (1943).
Vol. 1969: 199]
DLIKE LA W JOURNAL
to the agencies, indicating that decisions based on a wrong reason
generally cannot be expected to stand even though a reviewing
court can discern the possibility of a right one, should improve
the administrative process in general.
It should be noted that the foregoing rephrases Chenery I. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said "cannot stand"; I have changed this to
"generally cannot be expected to stand," a reformulation which
accords better with the case law as it has developed and with good
sense.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would not have been at all disturbed by
the first decision on which I rely for this qualification; rather, as
proved by his concurrence, he would have regarded it as wholly con-
sistent with Chenery. The case" stands for the scarcely questionable
principle that when agency action is statutorily compelled, it does
not matter that the agency which reached the decision required by
law did so on a debatable or even a wrong ground, for remand in
such a case would be but a useless formality. Despite the
distinctions drawn by Chenery in comparing the review of lower
courts with that of administrative agencies, 2 the differences cease
when the result is compelled. It is solely when "an order is valid
only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency
alone is authorized to make and which it has not made" that "a
judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative
judgment. 43
While another Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts Trustees
v. United States, might be regarded as a true indentation of
' Milk Transport, Inc. v. ICC, 190 F. Supp. 350 (D. Minn. 1960), affd per curiam, 368
U.S. 5 (1961). A citrus juice carrier argued that, before passage of clarifying amendments in
1958, it had been exempted from the certificate requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act
by § 203(b)(6) which granted a dispensation to trucks carrying "agricultural (including
horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)." Since it was less
than clear whether a given commodity was "agricultural" (and therefore exempt) or
"manufactured" (and therefore subject to certification), the question was much litigated
until Congress passed the amendments of 1958. At the same time, it enacted a grandfather
clause which, the trucker argued, granted rights to all those that had already been carrying
formerly exempt goods. The Commission denied the certificates because it believed that
carriers of fruit juices had not been exempt even before 1958. Not reaching that point, which
was extremely questionable, the Court affirmed the denial of an injunction on the ground
that the grandfather provision granted rights in the carriage only of eleven commodities that
were specifically listed, not including citrus juices.
12318 U.S. at 88.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Chenery, it is an altogether sound one. The case concerned action
by the Maritime Commission in fixing charter hire which the Court
found authorized by one section of the governing statute and not
forbidden by a second. The problem arose from the Commission's
belief that the second section rather than the first was the source of
its authority. The district court had determined there was not "the
slightest ground for assuming that if the Commission had been
apprized of the correct source of its authority ' 4 4 it would have
acted otherwise, and the Supreme Court concurred. It is impossible
to disagree with Mr. Justice Harlan's distinction of Chenery:
These cases are aimed at assuring that initial administrative
determinations are made with relevant criteria in mind and in a
proper procedural manner; when a mistake of the administrative
body is one that clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or
the substance of decision reached, . . .the sought extension of the
cases cited would not advance the purpose they were intended to
serve s
In other words Chenery does not mean that any assignment of a
wrong reason calls for reversal and remand; this is necessary only
when the reviewing court concludes there is a significant chance
that but for the error the agency might have reached a different
result.' In the absence of such a possibility, affirmance entails
neither an improper judicial invasion of the administrative province
nor a dispensation of the agency from its normal responsibility.
1 202 F. Supp. 297, 305 (D. Mass. 1962).
377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964).
16 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.. - U.S. - (1969), the text of which was not
available when this lecture was delivered, presented a close issue on this score. Six Justices
had there held that the NLRB's formulation in an adjudicated case and solely on a prospective
basis, of a requirement that employers must furnish lists of employees in contested elections,
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), constituted rule-making which was
invalid for lack of compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1964). The Court nevertheless sustained a subpoena, issued pursuant to a Board order, direct-
ing Wyman-Gordon to furnish such a list. The majority was made up of three Justices who re-
jected the procedural challenge to the Excelsior rule and four, speaking through Mr. Justice
Fortas, who upheld the challenge but sustained the subpoena because the order to Wyman-
Gordon had been made in an adjudicatory proceeding. Noting the Chenery objection in Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissent, the plurality opinion stated, - U.S. at ___ n.6:
To remand would be an idle and useless formality. Chenery does not require that
we convert judicial review .of agency action into a ping-pong game . . . .There
is not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a proceeding before the Board,
whether the Board acted through a rule or an order. It would be meaningless to
remand.
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In contrast, the earlier decision in Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." seems, at
first blush, an overruling sub silentio of Chenery I. The old
antagonists were cast in their familiar roles, but this time Justice
Black wrote for the majority and Justice Frankfurter in dissent.
Summarized briefly, the issue was whether an order requiring the
Union Pacific to establish through routes and joint rates with the
Denver & Rio Grande on certain commodities transported through
the Ogden, Utah, gateway violated the prohibition against short-
hauling in section 15(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Justice
Frankfurter read the Commission's report as flouting the
prohibition-an understandable reaction since the Commission for
years had been unsuccessfully recommending repeal of the
clause. Justice Black sought to rescue the order on one ground,
suggested in the Commission's report, which Justice Frankfurter
agreed would have supported a more limited order if the Commis-
sion had clearly relied upon it,4 and another which Frankfurter
thought less acceptable and not sufficiently broad to support the
order in toto even if the I.C.C. had adequately found and announced
it. Assuming arguendo that the two grounds would have sufficed to
support the entire order, we still appear to have a situation where,
although the agency could lawfully have arrived at the result it did,
its decision was primarily rested on an impermissible ground. Yet
the Court affirmed, and Chenery was not even mentioned by the
majority of seven, although pertinently cited in the dissent.
A decision of this sort, and particularly the majority's failure to
meet what at least was a fair point of the dissenters, inevitably gives
rise to cynical suspicion that Chenery has become a tool permitting
a reviewing court to do whatever it pleases. When the court
Mr. Justice Harlan could "perceive no justification whatever for this assertion." He thought
that "since the Excelsior rule was invalidly promulgated, it is clear that, at a minimum, the
Board is obliged on remand to recanvass all of the competing considerations before it may
properly announce the decision in this case."
Both Justices seem to have been right-Mr. Justice Harlan philosophically, Mr. Justice
Fortas practically. The strength of Mr. Justice Harlan's position, shared by Mr. Justice
Douglas, is that, by affording an effective sanction for a serious procedural breach, it would
serve to prevent such violations in the future.
0351 U.S. 321 (1956).
"Id. at 333, 342. Mr. Justice Harlan, who was in general agreement with Justice
Frankfurter, thought the Commission had sufficiently articulated this ground. Id. at 344.
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does not like an agency decision, it pulls Chenery out of the hat
and remands; when it likes the decision, as Mr. Justice Black did in
the Denver case, Chenery is conveniently forgotten. Yet I am not
certain that the Chenery and Denver & Rio Grande cases are
irreconcilable. As previously observed, the Court in Chenery was
concerned with an agency's venture into a new area; granted there
could be little doubt what the SEC would do on remand, it was
important to put the agency through the paces, both for the case
itself and as an example for the future. In Denver & Rio Grande,
however, the I.C.C. was working over familiar territory. The
Commission could not really have believed it had the freedom of
action limned in the passage from its report 4 which Justice
Frankfurter correctly deemed inconsistent with the statute. Why not
then consider this to be an opinion writer's overenthusiasm and,
particularly in light of the Commission's known tendency to give
the prohibition against short-hauling the narrowest allowable
interpretation, sustain the order on grounds indicated in the report
if these were legally tenable though they were not fully developed?
Against this background a recent case may be cited in which
Chenery was applied with what proved to be excellent results. One
of the less noted but nevertheless important problems arising from
the inclusion of the New Haven in the Penn Central system was its
effect on a through route from the west into New England that had
been a significant competitor of both the New York Central and
the Pennsylvania. Smaller carriers linked at Maybrook, N.Y., with
a line of the New Haven which extended over the Poughkeepsie
bridge and thence to yards at New Haven and points east and
north. The Commission had imposed special conditions protecting
the Maybrook interchange with the Central Railroad of New Jersey
and its connecting lines, the Reading and the Western Maryland,
pending decision on their application for inclusion in a proposed
system combining the Norfolk & Western and the Chesapeake &
Ohio.5° But it had denied a request for similar conditions by the
other, more important interchange partner at Maybrook, the Erie-
Lackawanna? 1 The Commission gave no less than eight reasons for
4, Denver& Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Union Pac. R.R., 287 I.C.C. 611,655-56 (1953).
Pennsylvania R.R.- Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 331 I.C.C. 643,752-53 (1967).
" Id. at 738; Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 331 I.C.C. 754, 754,
757-59 (1968).
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this different treatment 2 The district court thought seven of these
bases were invalid, some because they were insufficient on" their
face, while others, including a promise to keep watch of the
situation, were deemed inconsistent with the Commission's action
concerning the CNJ and, therefore, capricious. The one possibly
meritorious reason was that Erie-Lackawanna, already a part of the
Norfolk & Western System, was in far more severe competition with
Penn Central than the Central of New Jersey and its connections,
despite the latter's affiliation with B & 0 - C & 0. Although believing
that this might justify less stringent conditions in favor of Erie-
Lackawanna, we questioned whether it would justify none at all. More
important from a Chenery standpoint, should the court even con-
sider that question without knowing what the Commission would do
when it learned that seven of its eight reasons were found unsupport-
able? The court thought not and remanded.
The Commission's response refutes the claim that such a
remand will inevitably lead only to "the mechanical regurgitation
of 'canned' findings on a subject as to which nobody can entertain
any reasonable doubts . . . . I' It began by stating:
The three-judge court did not sustain us, pointing out weaknesses in
our reasons and concluding that our report offered "neither an analy-
sis of the anti-competitive effect of inclusion without protective
conditions nor convincing evidence that the pre-existing
coordination with E-L will be maintained." It noted that the policies
of the antitrust laws should be conscientiously applied, and
included in its remand the admonition that E-L's request be
reconsideredP
The I.C.C. did exactly that. Supplying eight pages of detailed
analysis, it concluded that it had erred and made inclusion of the
New Haven in Penn Central subject to elaborate and effective
conditions to protect the Erie-Lackawanna at Maybrook.55
A still more significant example of the virtues of Chenery is
furnished by a Supreme Court opinion, FCC v. RCA
Communications, Inc.," which, although written by Mr. Justice
31See New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Bondholders Committee v. United States, 289 F. Supp.
418,446 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Timberg, Administrative Findings of Fact, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 62, 69-70 (1941), quoted In
2 DAvIs § 16.12, at 479.
- 334 I.C.C. 25, 78 (1968). -
Id. at 78-86, 123-25.
346 U.S. 86 (1953). Not unexpectedly, Mr. Justice Black dissented.
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Frankfurter, curiously did not cite his brain-child. The
Communications Commission had granted a competing license for
radiotelegraph service on the basis that "the maintenance of
competition is in itself a sufficient goal of federal communications
policy so as to make it in the public interest to authorize a license
merely because competition, i.e., duplication of existing facilities,
was 'reasonably feasible.' -17 The Court found no such mandate in
the Communications Act; rather the statute left it to the
Commission to determine whether and when competitive service
was to be authorized. While it would not be "inadmissible for the
Commission, when it makes manifest that in so doing it is con-
scientiously exercising the discretion given it by Congress, to reach
a conclusion whereby authorizations would be granted whenever
competition is reasonably feasible, ' 58 the Commission must do this
through the exercise of its own judgment. "It must at least warrant,
as it were, that competition would serve some beneficial purpose" 9
rather than bow to a nonexistent statutory command. Once the
Court had concluded that the statute imposed no inexorable man-
date, clearly an issue for judicial determination, to affirm on the
basis that the applicant had nevertheless made a sufficient showing
of benefit would be to take over the agency's function and relieve
the latter of its responsibility to formulate standards. While the result
was to delay the establishment of competitive service for several
years, the precedential value of the agency's careful opinion on
remand was worth the price." As indicated by Professor Jaffe, "the
effectiveness of judicial supervision should be judged not only in
terms of the case in which the correction was administered, but in its
effect on doctrine in the long run."'"
Chenery has had a new field of application in a case relating to
individual rights. Vitarelli v. Seaton2 concerned an employee who
for alleged disloyalty had been dismissed from his job as a
government educational expert in the South Pacific Trust
Territories. The Government argued that since Vitarelli served at
"Id. at 91.
Id. at 96.
"Id. at 97.
"In re Mackey Radio & Tel. Co., 19 F.C.C. 1321 (1955), affd sub non. RCA
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
__ t L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 589 (1965).
62 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
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the pleasure of the Secretary of the Interior, who was not obliged
to give any reasons for the discharge, any defects in the loyalty
proceedings were irrelevant. All the Justices agreed that since the
agency had given disloyalty as its reason, the discharge had to
stand or fall on that basis; and, for failure to observe prescribed
procedures, the initial discharge fell.6 3 The bone of contention was a
letter sent by the Secretary two years later, informing Vitarelli that
the earlier notice had been modified to omit all reference to the
ground of dismissal. Because the letter was cast in terms of a
modification of the old discharge rather than a "new notification
.. . of summary dismissal power,"64 a majority of five found it
did not operate to discharge Vitarelli as of the time of its
receipt-a result which Justice Frankfurter with three of his
brothers thought-correctly, in my view-to ignore "the actualities
in the conduct of a Department concerned with terminating the
services of an undesired employee as completely and by whatever
means that may legally be accomplished." 5
While the main thrust of the opinion was not surprising, it
deserves mention because of the prospect that administrative law of
the 1970's will be increasingly concerned about decisions dealing
with individuals, often made hurriedly, on nonexistent or
inadequate records, and by administrators unequipped with opinion-
writing staffs66 Such a prospect makes one wonder whether the
application of Chenery to such cases will be a blessing or a curse.
Although this area may especially need judicial enforcement of the
requirement of reasoned decision,"1 the prolonged process of
reversal and remand for failure to state reasons adequately and
correctly would be peculiarly painful to individuals needing quick
relief and lacking the funds for protracted proceedings. A partial
answer may lie in the fact that cases of this sort generally arise
only between individual and agency, in contrast to the controversies
between individuals typical of the regulatory commissions.68 The
The majority did not cite Chenery; Mr. Justice Frankfurter did. Id. at 546-47 (dissenting
opinion).
"Id. at 545.
'
5 Id. at 548.
"See DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 5-9, 155-61 and passim (1968).
17 Id. at 103-06.
"Of course the conflicts between individuals are sometimes masked, as in Chenery I
itself. I do not mean to deny that the regulatory agencies deal with merely "personal"
problems, such as disciplinary proceedings by the SEC.
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importance of this distinction is that the courts will be invoked
only when the agency has denied relief to an individual or has
proceeded against him for a wrong reason, and not when it may
have erred in doing what he wanted.
Insufficient or Erroneous Findings
A doctrine closely allied to Chenery is that of reversal for
insufficient or erroneous findings.
We can begin with cases, often cited under this rubric but
not truly belonging there, where the findings on which the agency
relied to support its action reflected a misunderstanding of the
statute being applied.69 Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United
States0 is a fine example. A trucker sought certificates to transport
granite from South Dakota and Vermont to various other points.
The I.C.C. denied the application because there was no showing that
the rail service was inadequate, with the exceptions-evidently
deemed to be of minor importance-that it was too slow and too
dear. Not surprisingly, the Court reversed:
To reject a motor carrier's application on the bare conclusion that
existing rail service can move the available traffic, without regard
to the inherent advantages of the proposed service, would give one
mode of transportation unwarranted protection from competition
from others. . . . [A] rate benefit attributable to differences
between the two modes of transportation is an "inherent
advantage" of the competing type of carrier and cannot be ignored
by the Commission 7
It is needlessly confusing to think of such a decision as resting on
inadequate findings. What the Commission had done, in effect, was
to read the statute as saying, "Do not issue a certificate for motor
transportation if the goods can be moved by rail." On that theory
its findings adequately supported the decision. But the erroneous
construction of the statute called for reversal as a matter of law.72
In contrast, one of Mr. Justice Cardozo's few Supreme Court
opinions 'on administrative law, United States v. Chicago, M.,
"2 DAVIs § 16.09.
355 U.S. 83 (1957).
7' Id. at 90-92.
72 United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475 (1942), ICC v.
Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947), and Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300
(1958), likewise fall under this rubric.
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St.P. & P.R.R.,73 is a true instance of reversal for inadequate findings.
The Commission had held that certain proposed rail rates, although
concededly compensatory, would be unreasonably low. However,
apart from using some pejorative expressions, the Commission had
done nothing to indicate why. Reversal was demanded, although on a
ground quite different from that in the Schaffer decision. Whereas
there the Commission had been wrong on the law, here it may have
been right both on the law and on the facts but had made no
findings adequate to demonstrate thisi4
A third type of rather easy case, this time for affirmance rather
than reversal, is where adequate findings can be discerned, at least
with a modicum of judicial benevolence, even though the ribbons
have not been neatly tied. For example, in United States v. Pierce
Auto Freight Lines s the I.C.C. permitted each of two truckers to
begin through service on the West Coast. Other carriers protested
on the ground that while the agency had declared that individually
each of the proposed operations was in the public interest, it had
not analyzed the cumulative impact of both and thus could not
properly have concluded that the public interest would be served by
its decision. The Court in brushing this contention aside stated:
Apart from the fact that . . . there can be no presumption that the
Commission disregarded the public or any other interest, there are
two obvious answers. One is that the Commission, in making the
separately stated findings, could not have been oblivious to the
competitive consequences of its order or the relation of those
consequences to the public interest. The other is that those findings,
read in the light of the report, adequately and expressly cover the
element of public convenience and necessity, including the
competitive factors which the Commission inescapably had in
mind 6
n United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 294 U.S. 499 (1935).
11 After finding nothing in the report to substantiate the Commission's fear that the
proposed rates would unduly "disturb" established rate structures and differentials, the
Court continued: "At the very least the findings should inform us, if only approximately, of
the extent of the expected loss; they should make it clear whether the impairment of revenues
will be trivial or substantial, for only thus can the impairment be related to capacity for
service. Nothing of the kind is shown. The schedules are to be congealed as they exist,
because if not congealed they will be fluid, fluidity is change, and change has the potency, if
not the promise, of disturbance. As to conditions in Indiana, this and hardly more is the
teaching of the report." Id. at 508.
Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931), and North Carolina v. United States, 325
U.S. 507 (1945), also illustrate this principle.
327 U.S. 515 (1946).
I d. at 531-32.
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It would indeed have been sheer formalism to remand in order for
the Commission to announce that one hand had really known what
the other was doingY7
The troublesome cases arise where one or more of the agency's
findings are based on insubstantial evidence, or are otherwise
wrong, whereas other findings, adequate to support the order, are
proper and correct-the situation the court encountered with
respect to the price the Norfolk & Western had been ordered to pay
for the three smaller roads.7 8 A good take-off point is the famous,
if somewhat inscrutable decision in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Co. 71 In attempting to set reasonable rates for a natural gas
company, the Power Commission first delineated an appropriate
rate base using the "prudent investment" theory, and then
determined Hope's fair rate of return. I am not here concerned
with the issue that gave rise to Mr. Justice Jackson's brilliant
dissent denouncing a rate-base approach to the fixing of prices for
natural gas,80 but with a different question. One of Hope's com-
plaints was that the agency had excluded from the rate base
some $17,000,000, the bulk of this representing the cost of well
drilling prior to the beginning of state regulation in 1923, which
Hope had charged to operating expenses in line with then industry
practice. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
thought the company was right, 8 as did Mr. Justice Reed.82 The
majority, however, upheld the Power Commission without passing
on the point at all, saying:
In view of this disposition of the controversy we need not stop to
inquire whether the failure of the Commission to add the
$17,000,000 of well-drilling and other costs to the rate base was
consistent with the prudent investment theory as developed and
applied in particular cases. 3
SSee also Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959). Contrast
ABC Air Freight Co. v. CAB, 391 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1968), reversing an order construed as
calling for the licensing of any trucker to be an air freight forwarder, although the findings
with respect to impact on the industry were limited to four applicants. See my discussion of
this case in 21 AD. L. REV., at 7-8.
"See text accompanying note 50 supra.
r' 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
Id. at 628.
"134 F.2d 287,3.0 (1943).
320 U.S. at 624.
Id. at 605-06.
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It is not altogether easy to see why the Court did not have to
"stop to inquire" about this. Granted that the annual earnings of
$2,191,314 which the rates were expected to produce might be
constitutionally sufficient, the Commission had purported to use a
prudent investment theory in reaching its conclusion. How then
could the Court know the Commission would not have allowed
more if made aware that its exclusion of $17,000,000 from the rate
base was wrong under that theory, particularly since the
Commission had arrived at its earnings figure by a computation
applying a 6 1/2 percent rate of return to a rate base of
$33,712,52691 That question was scarcely answered by making
light of Hope's exaggerated arguments based on combining a
reproduction cost rate base with an 8 percent rate of return8 5
If there is an answer, it must be cast in the form of a
conclusion reached by the Court and drawn from the Commission's
opinion as a whole that earnings of $2,191,314 were all that Hope
required under the statute, no matter what the correct rate base
might be under the theory the Commission was using." One can
hardly doubt the Court was right in thinking that even if it should
disagree about the propriety of the excision from the rate base
under standard prudent investment principles, the Power
Commission would have found some way to avoid giving Hope
earnings half again as high as those it had allowed. Whether the
Commission might not have given somewhat more is less certain.
The Hope case thus stands for the principle that, at least in rate
making, an error in a subsidiary finding does not demand reversal
if the court is reasonably satisfied that the agency, apprised of its
error, would come to the same conclusion and this would be legally
tenable."
The problem was more explicitly considered in a later case far
removed from rate-making, Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board8 The court of appeals had invalidated a
Id. at 599.
Id. at 599, 605.
U Id. at 602-06.
The Hope case may well be regarded as making an extreme boundary of leniency. For a
case where the Court, on the basis of an unusually detailed scrutiny of the record, was not so
tatisfied, see Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 626 (1945).
"367 U.S. I, 66-67 (1961).
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subsidiary finding that the purpose of certain secret practices was
to promote the objectives of the Communist Party. It held, on the
other hand, that the whole record supporteat the Board's ultimate
conclusion that the Party was substantially controlled by the Soviet
Union and refused to reverse because of the one erroneous finding on
which the Board, in the summaries of its modified reports, had not
relied at all 9 The Supreme Court affirmed, again speaking through
Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
Where a Court of Appeals strikes as not sustained by the evidence
a subsidiary administrative finding upon which the agency itself
does not purport to rely, it would be an unwarranted exercise of
reviewing power to remand for further proceedings. Remand would
be called for only if there were a solid reason to believe that
without that subsidiary finding the agency would not have arrived
at the conclusion at which it did arrive."
The Chief Justice dissented, ironically citing Chenery to its
author9 The majority opinion, however, seems to be a sensible
relaxation of the reversal-for-erroneous-findings rule, somewhat
akin to the easing of the true Chenery rule in Massachusetts
Trustees v. United States 2
NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.93 is a datum on the
other side-in some ways a rather curious one. At issue was an
order of the Labor Board condemning an employer for speaking
against an independent union and in favor of a company dominated
one. The Court thought the order was unjustified if based on the
speech alone but would be supportable if grounded on the
employer's whole course of conduct. Professing uncertainty
concerning the basis of the order, it remanded for clarification.
Unsurprisingly, the Board came back with the right answer and the
Court dutifully enforced. 4 Such a performance strikes a decided
note of futility. If it has any justification, it must be on the
ground that the subject lay so close to the first amendment as to
make clarity peculiarly desirable, A greater exercise in futility was
indulged in by the author of the Hope opinion in a decision handed
" Id. at 67.
"Id.
', Id. at 133-35.
See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
314 U.S. 469 (1941).
319 U.S. 533 (1943).
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down on the very same day. That decision remanded a case to the
I.C.C. to find whether a carrier to which the I.C.C. had granted a
certificate of abandonment was "operated as a" part or parts of a
general steam railroad system of transportation"-as it had to be
to make the order valid-when, as noted by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in dissent, this was never questioned before the
Commission and the facts "are spread at large upon the record and
are not in controversy." '95
CONCLUSION
The lessons concerning Chenery I and its relatives that can be
drawn from this tour d'horizon are several, the most noteworthy
being the realization that we are dealing not with one principle but
with three. The first principle-that even when an agency has acted
on an admissible construction of the statute and has made
sufficient factual findings, a reviewing court may still reverse and
remand if the agency has not adequately explained why it chose to
do what it did-is notably illustrated by the Burlington case9 On
the other hand, courts should not be obtuse to reasons implicit in
the determination itself and thereby cause needless expense and
delay. If it be charged that this is hardly a precise rule for decision,
an answer is that no one has yet devised a satisfactory substitute
for good sense.
Closely allied with this principle is the Chenery doctrine
proprement dit. Where the agency has rested decision on an
unsustainable reason, the court should generally reverse and
remand even though it discerns a possibility, even a strong one,
that by another course of reasoning the agency might come to the
same result. This is true whether the wrong reason is an erroneous
view of the law, as in Chenery itself and in RCA Communications,
Yonkers V,. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 696-97 (1944). The Yonkers decision seems
basically inconsistent with United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515 (1946),
and Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959). The Commission
speedily made the predictable finding, the District Court again affirmed, and the Supreme
Court affirmed per curiam. 323 U.S. 675 (1944).
A fairly recent decision, Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. v. United States, 375 U.S. 150
(1963), casts Mr. Justice Black in the unfamiliar role of advocating reversal for lack of
adequate findings. Appraisal is rendered difficult by the majority's summary affirmance and
the absence of a published opinion in the district court. Simply on a reading of Justice
Black's dissent, there would seem to have been a strong case both that the findings were
erroneous and that, once the necessary corrections were made, the order could not stand.
"See particularly note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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or simply a rationale within the area of the agency's supposed
expertise that is logically untenable, as were seven of the eight
reasons in the Maybrook interchange decision 97 -although in the
latter case a court should be more respectful to the agency than
when it has detected an error of law. Particularly as revealed by the
RCA Communications decision,9 the process, even though it may
appear wasteful as regards the case in hand, is important for the
proper execution of the legislative will, since proceeding on the
right path may require or at least permit the agency to make
qualifications and exceptions that the wrong one would not.
This leaves the third principle, reversal for inadequate or
erroneous findings-doubtless the most frequently encountered of
the trinity. Within this principle, however, it is necessary to make
distinctions. There are those cases where, although the court speaks
of inadequate findings, the real trouble is that the agency has
misconstrued the statute. Here there must be reversal and usually a
direction rather than a discretionary remand.99 A different type of
case is presented where, although the agency's action may be
justified, it has not demonstrated this by findings on the basic issue
sufficiently detailed to meet the statute's requirements. 1' ° Here also
reversal is inevitable, both to preserve the meaningful quality of
judicial review and to force the agencies to do their homework.
Further along the spectrum are the cases where the only error is in
a finding relied on in greater or less degree, along with other solid
ones, as a predicate for the ultimate conclusion.101 This is where the
purists and the realists lock horns. The purists insist that any
guessing by a court about what the agency might do when apprised
of such an error is an unlawful intrusion into the sanctity of the
administrative process, and once such an error is detected, the case
must go back so that the agency, as the sole repository of
authority, can decide it right. The realists answer that neither the
Constitution nor the Administrative Procedure Act forbids judges to
exercise common sense. I am an enthusiastic member of the latter
school, which maintains that reversal for factual error should be
'7See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
"See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
"See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
IN See notes 73-74supra and accompanying text.
M' See notes 79-95 supra and accompanying text.
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dispensed with the same practicality that the courts have exercised
in applying Chenery itself.02 Support for this position may be
derived from opinions for the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas in
Hope,0 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Subversive Activities Control
Board," 4 and now Mr. Justice Fortas in the Penn Central case.05
Finally there is the case where the agency has simply failed to make
a finding that the record compelled.' Reversal in such a case
would be an outrage; despite the language in Chenery concerning
the difference between review of an agency and of a lower court,107
I perceive no reason why the court should not make, or regard as
made, a finding that the agency could not lawfully have refused.
While I insist on the importance and value of such distinctions,
I am not so naive as to thin'k that all cases can be neatly
pigeonholed and the proper result predetermined so that judges can
be replaced by computers. Intuitions arising from a feel of the case
and a knowledge of the administrative process will avoid expensive
and time-consuming remands that rigid adherence to doctrine
might require. I am not bothered overmuch by the undoubted truth
that a reviewing court-is, more likely to take a charitable view
toward error in subsidiary findings when it symphathizes with the'
agency's end result, than when it does not."8 Refusal to reverse on
the basis of a judicial belief that the agency is certain to come to
the same conclusion is rarely objectionable to the agency, however
painful it may be to a litigant who would profit by the delay
incident to even a fruitless remand. On the other hand, if the courts
suspect that an agency is not truly carrying out the purpose of a
statute, no matter what its professions, reversals for inadequate or
erroneous subsidiary findings will require the agency to rethink the
problem and, if it adheres to the previous decision, to state its
position in a manner that may provoke a ruling on an issue of
law. 09
,22 See e.g.. text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
'"See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
" See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
'"See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
'a Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944).
207 318 U.S. at 88.
"'See 2 DAVIS § 16.10.
"'Thus, the extraordinarily high percentage of reversals of denials of disability pensions by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare doubtless reflects judicial belief that the
agency has failed to display the benevolent approach that Congress intended, even though it
has appropriately parroted the statutory test. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
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In sum, while judges must be respectful of the policy-making
and fact-finding functions of the agencies, they need not-indeed,
should not-regard themselves and the agencies as working in
completely water-tight compartments. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
remarked, although in a somewhat different context:
Courts and administrative agencies are not to be regarded as
competitors in the task of safeguarding the public interest. United
States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183; FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U.S. 134. Courts no less than administrative bodies are
agencies of government. Both are instruments for realizing public
purposes."'
To the extent that the broad language of Chenery implied
otherwise, it has indeed been eroded, by its author as much as
anyone. But when sensibly applied it and its related principles
continue to be vital and useful doctrines of administrative law.
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 608-09 (1965). I am proud to have helped initiate this trend in
Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960). See the comment in 2 DAVIS § 14.14
(Supp. 1965).
"I Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC. 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942).
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